needs, also including school drop-outs, should have been carried out in close co-operation with parents and teachers and the issue thoroughly discussed between them to work out a practical plan for their inclusion into suitable activities for them.

2.5. Conclusions

① It is difficult to measure any project impact on the well-being of the displaced children in Jalalabad especially in this later phase of the programme. A direct impact has been observed in the early stages of the project when the STOP-seminars were most relevant and worked as a direct impetus for the child-oriented activities. With STOP-seminars as the main input to the quality of the activities, the project, with its present design, should have been limited to " an emergency intervention" with a duration of 6-12 months.

② To ensure quality in the non-formal activities, and thus consider the well-being of children in the longer term, a 2 year project should have been planned with a much more comprehensive phased approach. The psychosocial needs of the camp children, should have been thoroughly pre-assessed and re-assessed (involving teachers, parents, the formal school and other agencies)regularly during project implementation. The type of activities and the necessary support to teachers and children to run these activities, including guidelines for monitoring of the quality, should have been worked out step by step.

③ At this stage of the project it will be extremely difficult to reverse later developments and enhance the quality of the ongoing activities without a substantial input of support from outside.

④ To justify a continuation of the programme certain minimum requirements must be met to ensure the well-being of the participating children. These are listed under Recommendations.

3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FORMAL EDUCATION SYSTEM & NON-FORMAL EDUCATION ACTIVITIES.

3.1. Clarification of Terminology

A variety of terms such as 'formal education', 'self-help schools', 'non-formal schools', 'play and learning activities' have been used interchangeably throughout project documents and reports. This indiscriminate use has meant that it is not always clear what educational activities were taking place and how they changed during the course of the project. To clarify how the educational activities have changed throughout the project, they have been loosely categorised, for the purposes of this evaluation, into two groups: formal education and non-formal educational activities.

'Formal education/formal schools' will refer to the primary schools which were established in the camps by the Department of Education of the Nangarhar Shura. These used an approved curriculum and textbooks with teachers and headmasters being selected, paid and supervised by the Department. Some supervision was carried out and an examination system and annual promotions introduced.

Non-formal activities or classes will refer to all the other activities set by parents and teachers. In most cases these were initiated after participation in STOP seminars. There are two categories of such activities in this project:

→ 'Self-help schools' which were those groups of classes organised by the displaced community based on the Afghan school system. No formal curriculum was adopted and teachers were selected from the educated members of the community. The teachers were responsible for all educational management decisions including the age range of students, class size and timing of classes. These classes existed at the beginning of the project but were later absorbed into the formal schools.

→ Activities set up by the community in addition to the 'self help' classes but which have continued for the duration of the project. These include English and Maths classes, kodakistans, literacy classes and extra-curricular activities such as religious classes, calligraphy classes and sports such as football and volleyball.

3.2. Planned Implementation

The establishment of community-supported non-formal education rather than formal schools was an immediate priority for this project for two reasons. First a more flexible curriculum and greater opportunities for play which would be of benefit to war-affected children could be built into the non-formal classes. Second, there was a greater opportunity for the community to assume responsibility for non-formal schools and in this way become more self-reliant. The rationale was that the non-formal schools being opened earlier would then form the basis for the formal schools.

The project was planned to be implemented in four phases with the first three being implemented between June and September 1994. Phase 4 the setting up of formal education was planned to begin **only when Phase 3 had been completed** at the beginning of September. This was to coincide with the beginning of the school year.

3.3. Actual Implementation

3.3.1. Initial Phase: July - October 1994

This phase of the project was very successful. Within a month STOP model training was being carried out in 11 blocks in Hesar-e-Shahi camp and 4700 children were benefiting from non-formal activities. At the time of the Mid-Term Evaluation in September/October 1994, a further 14 blocks had been covered and the number of beneficiaries was 12040 of which the majority, 7406 were participating in the 'self-help' classes.

Project implementation in this phase differed from that planned. This was partly due to internal reasons such as an underestimation of the demand for STOP training and self-help classes and the limited capacity of both RBTU trainers and NPO/RRAA field workers to meet this demand. The latter was caused by the rapid and unplanned expansion of Hesar-e-Shahi camp at this stage. This meant, for example, that there not enough staff to ensure that all STOP model training was completed by September 1994.

Not all agencies were carrying out their responsibilities as agreed. UNICEF who were responsible for negotiating with the authorities failed to keep The Department of Education fully informed as to the objectives of the project. In retrospect, it seems as if the Department of Education were keen to prevent an alternative formal system of education being developed. In an initial meeting in July they suggested that the UNO curriculum should be used in the self-help classes. This was unacceptable to NCA/NRC since these books contained violent images such as number of knives or kalashnikovs being used for maths.

3.3.2. Opening of the Formal Schools in Hesar-e-Shahi camp

The decision taken by the Department of Education with support from UNICEF to open formal primary schools in Hesar-e-Shahi camp completely changed the project. This decision was taken despite the fact that STOP model training was not yet complete in the camp and thus the phased approach of the project would be ignored. UNICEF was party to this decision and yet at the same time, ostensibly a participating agency in the NPO/RRAA project.

The opening of formal schools had a number of specific consequences:

→ The 'self-help' schools were gradually absorbed into the formal system. In this process, components introduced into the 'self-help' schools such as more time for play, shorter learning periods and a more flexible curriculum were dropped and not included in the formal schools.

→ The number of children benefiting from the project dropped from 12040 from just 25 blocks in October 1994 to 10001 from all blocks in December 1994.

→ Some children dropped out of school altogether. Others especially those traumatized, found it hard to readapt to the formal system where they were expected to concentrate for long periods of time.

NCA/NRC and NPO/RRAA took a decision to limit their involvement in the formal system . They

were to participate in co-ordination meetings with other agencies, supply educational materials and support the construction of the shelters in which the schools were held. The non-formal activities were facilitated alongside the formal schools.

Their decision to limit their involvement is understandable given the fact that the formal schools had been opened without consulting NPO/RRAA or seeking to involve them in the transition to formal education. The speed at which they were opened meant that there was little opportunity either to integrate the existing self-help schools systematically into the formal schools or consult the community on how they could become involved with the new schools. Finally the textbooks being distributed continued to be those containing pages with the violent pages thus contradicting any programme aimed at overcoming the effects of war.

The consequence of this decision was that the project did not build on any of the inputs it had already made to the educational process in the camps. Many of the teachers and headmasters of the 'self-help' schools transferred into the formal schools. Initially all of the equipment and educational materials used in the formal schools had been supplied by the project. By effectively operating alongside the formal schools, the opportunity, for example, of ensuring these schools would be more conducive to supporting war-affected children was lost. In addition, the content of the non-formal classes could have been more systematically linked to what was being taught in the classroom. The precedent set in Hesar-e-Shahi camp influenced the relationship between the formal schools and non-formal educational activities as established in other project locations; New Hadda camp and Islamabad village.

3.3.3. Subsequent Implementation of Educational Activities

From the beginning of 1995, STOP model training was started in the IIRO section of Hesar-e-Shahi camp, New Hadda camp and later in Islamabad village in March 1995. This expansion of the project put pressure on the already limited capacity of the NPO/RRAA Education Unit to monitor and support the activities in Hesar-E-Shahi camp.

Internal NRC/NCA reports show that the NPO/RRAA education unit were concerned from early 1995 that activities in Hesar-e-Shahi were 'on the verge of collapse'. NRC/NCA were also concerned at this decline.

At the same time, the expansion of the project was hindered by a series of external factors (For details of the project chronology see Appendix 4). The most significant were:

- The restrictions and later the ban on women workers and women's activities introduced by the Nangarhar shura in December 1994 and rigorously policed from June 1995. This change in policy made it difficult and then impossible for women field workers to carry out STOP model training for women or support activities such as Kodakistans or literacy classes which were run by women.

- Numbers of children participating in non-formal classes were reduced by the large scale return of displaced to Kabul in mid-1995 when the security situation in Kabul dramatically improved. In New Hadda camp alone the number of blocks were reduced by over half from 24 to 10.

→ The activities were totally neglected and unsupported from September to November 1995 when the NPO/RRAA Education Unit, with no prior warning, moved to Kabul to set up a new programme.

A report produced by NPO/RRAA in September 1995 shows that a total of 14,923 children were taking part in classes in all 3 camps and Islamabad village. After NPO/RRAA /RRAA returned to the camps in November 1995, it was felt that only 20% of those activities recorded in September 1995 were still operating. This means that only 2985 children were benefiting.

Following the return of the NPO/RRAA /RRAA Education Unit to Jalalabad in 1995, intensive effort was devoted to restarting the programme. By May 1996, NPO/RRAA reported the following statistics on the numbers of children participating in non-formal educational activities in all 3 project locations: 14692 children were participating in Hesar-e-Shahi, 851 in the HRO section, 3172 in New Hadda and 303 in Islamabad village.

3.4. Observations on Implementation

3.4.1. Support for formal and non-formal education

The community's priority has been for formal education. Some people were supportive of the non-formal classes. The majority were more concerned that these classes should continue as a channel for external assistance rather than for any intrinsic educational value. The exceptions have been literacy classes for girls and the kodakistans.

3.4.2. Relationship between the formal schools and the non-formal educational activities

The formal schools and the non-formal educational activities are closely linked on some levels. As already stated, the 'self-help' schools had provided the basis for many if not all formal schools. A significant percentage of headmasters and teachers teaching in the formal schools had received STOP model training and had previously worked in the 'self-help' schools. Many of these teachers and headmasters are continuing to run the non-formal Maths and English classes and some literacy classes for boys in the shelters used for the formal schools. Inputs for the formal schools such as educational materials and equipment have been provided by SCA and NPO/RRAA in the early stages of the project.

Kodakistans and literacy classes for women and girls are not so closely linked with the formal schools. These are run by women in their own tents and compounds. For cultural reasons, many women and girls prefer to be taught separately and within the compounds of relatives and neighbours.

3.4.3. The numbers of children participating in the formal schools and non-formal educational activities

As the fieldwork was carried out when the formal schools were closed, it was impossible to collect data on student attendance. However, data collected by UNICEF in Hesar-e-Shahi show that a total of 5879 students (3678 boys, 2194 girls) were attending school in Hesar-e-Shahi in February 1996. IRC report that a total of 3591 students (1953 boys, 1638 girls) were in school in New Hadda camp

in March 1996. In Islamabad village, the Headmaster reported in an interview that 800 students (550 boys, 350 girls) were registered in the school.

The most recent figures for the numbers participating in the non-formal activities are those reported by NPO/RRAA in May 1996. The NPO/RRAA figures were compared crudely with the school attendance figures described above and with school attendance figures collected during the evaluation in Islamabad village. The aims of this comparison were, firstly, to identify any marked difference between the numbers participating in the formal schools and comparable non-formal classes supported by the project. In addition, the comparison might given an indication of how representative the NPO/RRAA data were of fully functioning regular activities.

This could only be a crude comparison because NPO/RRAA do not state clearly when their data was collected. In addition, the school attendance figures do not take into account those of non-school age attending kodakistans. Finally it has been very difficult to determine what percentage of school-age children participate in both formal schools and non-formal classes. The impression gained from interviews is that a high percentage of those attending Maths and English classes also attend formal schools.

The attendance figures reported by NPO/RRAA in New Hadda and IIRO camp were in line with those reported to be attending formal schools. However there was a wide divergence between those attending formal schools - 5879 students - and 14692 children participating in non-formal classes in Hesar-e-Shahi camp. The following evidence would seem to call into question the NPO/RRAA figures for attendance in Hesar-e-Shahi camp.

→ From interviews conducted with kodakistan and literacy teachers in Hesar-e-Shahi camp and observations of existing classes, the impression was of classes functioning erratically with a declining attendance. It is unlikely, therefore, that this divergence could be explained by large numbers of kodakistans and literacy classes.

→ Complete attendance sheets were not available in the majority of classes that were observed in New Hadda and Hesar-e-Shahi. This was partly a reflection of irregular classes and poor attendance. It was also because NPO/RRAA has a policy of only distributing one attendance sheet every two/three months.

→ In a number of classes observed in both Hesar-e-Shahi and New Hadda, over 40% of students present were not found on the attendance sheet. In these cases, it was clear that the class being observed had been hurriedly assembled for the purposes of the evaluation and bore little relation to the actual class that might have been functioning at some time before.

→ No volleyball and football games were observed and many interviewees stated in Hesar-e-Shahi that volleyball teams had stopped. Admittedly, the hot weather made it less likely that such games would be still be being played. However, teachers and headmasters when interviewed all complained about the poor quality of the volleyball. In New Hadda, anecdotal evidence collected in one block would suggest that the volleyball teams are more active in that camp.

3.4.4. Inappropriate content

The specific educational objectives of the non-formal activities which NPO/RRAA supported after the formal schools had opened, are not clear. In the Maths classes, it appears that the purpose was to augment what was being taught in the formal system. In others, such as English it appeared to be to teach very simple words and sentences. Many kodakistans were run as preparatory classes for primary school where numbers and the alphabet were being taught to very young children. children. Religious classes followed the traditional model employed elsewhere in Afghanistan.

3.4.5. Quality of the Teaching Process

In comparison with many teachers now recruited in Afghanistan, the educational background of most teachers interviewed or observed was high. The majority were educated to a minimum of Grade 12 with some holding degrees from Kabul University or qualifications from Army Colleges. The commitment of the teachers to the non-formal activities was quite high given that many were already teaching in the formal system, their major source of income was wheat and the minimal support they received from NPO/RRAA.

The quality of teaching methods was highly variable and depended on the individual strengths of the teacher. A poor grasp of the subject, no lesson plan, the use of rote learning and poor interaction with the students were the hallmarks of many classes observed.

3.4.6. Quality of the Learning Process

Student engagement was highly variable reflecting the scarcity of suitable teaching and learning materials, toys and the minimal use of teaching aids and the big age range in the classes. In exceptional classes, a high percentage of children were actively involved and were learning something. In the remainder, children were passive and detached from the class.

3.4.7. Availability of suitable teaching materials and basic supplies

The major contribution of NPO/RRAA to the non-formal educational activities has been the distribution of equipment, toys and stationery. In May 1996, NPO/RRAA reported distributing, amongst other things, 26806 notebooks, 11300 pencils and 383 English for Beginners in Hesar-e-Shahi alone. In contrast, the impression gained from observing classes, interviewing teachers and scrutinising NPO/RRAA's monitors' records was that a lack of stationery, sports equipment and toys is a major factor in classes functioning irregularly.

Some classes had no teaching materials and those that did often used inappropriate textbooks for the age and learning ability of the students participating. Literacy classes were using UNO Grade 1 language books. Maths classes were using UNO Grade 1 and 2 textbooks and English classes IRC English textbooks. The unrevised UNO textbooks with the violent images were not observed to be in use.

3.4.8. The Minimal Level of Monitoring and Supervision

Non-formal activities received minimal support from the NPO/RRAA Education Unit. The major

function of the NPO/RRAA monitors in visiting a class was to distribute stationery and to check attendance figures. Visits by NPO/RRAA staff were infrequent. New monitoring forms introduced in November 1995 show that most classes were visited from between once every three months to once every six months.

Little assistance was given to teachers to help overcome pedagogical or attendance problems. Teachers are quoted in the monitoring sheets as asking for more textbooks, teaching materials and toys. In addition a frequent request is for biscuits and food for the children in the kodakistans. The response of the monitor as stated on the monitoring form is to advise the teacher to make do with what he/she has.

As no objectives or guidelines had been set for running the non-formal educational activities, NPO/RRAA Education Unit understandably had little with which to monitor students'/teachers' performance. Also their limited capacity meant it was difficult for them to adequately support classes.

3.4.9. Activities in Laghman province

Primary schools have been established in Islamabad village from before war so there was no similar demand for formal education. Non-formal classes have functioned erratically with sporadic attendance and in this sense are not dissimilar from those in the IDP camps. They have had even less support from NPO/RRAA because of the logistics in reaching Islamabad village. The linkage between these activities and STOP model training has been more tenuous than in the camps. This is because the area has not been directly affected by war in recent years. Those activities which have continued are those where there is the greatest community interest; literacy for girls and religious classes. The former have now been suspended after opposition from local mullahs.

3.5. Conclusions

① The project planned a phased approach to the opening of formal schools. These schools were to be opened after STOP model training had been carried out and 'self-help' schools opened. This was in principle correct in an emergency situation where there was the need to provide structure and schooling for war-affected children whose education had been disrupted by the move to Jalalabad. As there was a functioning Department of Education in Jalalabad , this should have been involved in these early stages of the project. This might have prevented the Department from opening formal schools at a later date which were to compete with the 'self-help' schools. However it is clear that NRC/NCA did try to elicit the support of the Department for the project but was met with minimal response. In addition, the chosen curriculum of the Department of Education, that provided by UNO/ECA was unacceptable to NRC/NCA because of its violent content.

② The decision by UNICEF to support the Department of Education's decision to open formal schools in the camps without fully consulting NCA/NRC, RBTU or NPO/RRAA undermined the project at a crucial phase. The reasons for this sudden change in policy and their withdrawal of support from this project have never been clear.

③ In the circumstances under which the formal schools were opened, it was difficult for

NRC/NCA, RBTU and NPO/RRAA to have other than a limited involvement with the formal schools. However in the process, the opportunity for building on the awareness of the teachers of how to support war-affected children was missed. Likewise there appears to have been no systematic co-ordination of the teaching inputs in both formal schools and non-formal activities.

④ Once the non-formal system was divorced from the formal system. there were no explicit objectives or guidelines set for running the non-formal classes. They were simply facilitated as an end in themselves. This has increasingly lead to activities that are inappropriate for the age and learning capacity of the students and are of poor quality.

⑤ The level of community satisfaction with the majority of classes was perceived to be low with the exceptions being literacy classes for girls and women and the better kodakistans. The indication that most non-formal classes have not been running consistently for long periods of time is evidence of this. As is reports from teachers that children have to be almost coerced to attend some classes.

⑥ Monitoring and supervision of these classes has been inadequate. There has been no attempt to build on the interest and strengths of the teachers.

⑦ The numbers of children reported to be participating in the project in May 1996 would appear to be inaccurate especially in the case of Hesar-e-Shahi camp. Likewise, the large quantities of stationery reported to have been distributed are inconsistent with the repeated lack of stationery and equipment mentioned by teachers and parents.

⑧ The kodakistans and literacy classes for girls and boys could be supported in the future on the provison that certain minimum requirements are met.

4. IMPACT OF TRAINING INPUTS ON THE PROJECT

4.1. Planned Training Inputs

RBTU has been responsible for the main training inputs in this project. Training activities have been implemented by both RBTU trainers from Peshawar (basically 1 female and 1 male trainer) and by NPO/RRAA Field Workers (FWs). The NPO/RRAA team did consist of 4 females and 4 males but now has only 2 males.

Different types of training input were planned to be provided at two levels:

Community Level

- → STOP-seminars for the IDP community conducted by RBTU trainers and observed by NPO/RRAA FWs
- → STOP-seminars for the community conducted by NPO/RRAA FWs and supervised by the RBTU trainers
- → Social Welfare Committee Training for the community conducted by NPO/RRAA FWs and supervised by RBTU trainers (this training was conducted for the community by RBTU trainers in the earliest phase of the project)

NPO/RRAA Field Worker Level

- Social Animation Training (SAT) which was planned to continue over one year and to be carried out by RBTU trainers

4.1.1. Weaknesses in project design

The weaknesses in the project design have led to a lack of clear and specific objectives for all training inputs. In all Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) between NPO/RRAA and RBTU, it is assumed that carrying out STOP model training will automatically meet the overall objectives of the project which is to improve the well-being of war-affected children.

The objectives for the SAT-training for the NPO/RRAA FWs are only described in such general terms as: " to enable the NPO/RRAA Ed. Unit for community development work and assess community needs" and later "related to the activities" was added in the 1996 agreement. Curriculum was to be prepared by RBTU in co-operation with NPO/RRAA and to be revised according to needs.

The objective for the Committee Training is set out in the current MOU. It states that RBTU is responsible for "training of the established Social Welfare Committees in each block in Hesar-e-Shahi and New Hadda. The training package, prepared in co-operation with NPO/RRAA, should include training in Islamic Khedmatgar, Child-to- Child, Children with special needs and CRC."

The responsibility for follow-up and supervision of all implemented training activities clearly lies with the RBTU trainers. The MOU states that RBTU and NPO/RRAA share the responsibility for the follow-up of those non-formal classes and the operation of committees which have been

1. INTRODUCTION

This project was initiated in response to a demand for education from the internally displaced Afghans settled in camps around Jalalabad in 1994. Although basic services such as food, shelter and water were being provided, no agency was taking responsibility for education services. NCA/NRC as part of its involvement in the emergency assistance programme sought to alleviate this problem. At the same time, NRC received funds from Lillehammer Olympic Aid (LOLA) for children affected by war in Afghanistan and it was decided that these funds should be used for increasing the access of refugee or displaced children to education.

NCA/NRC developed a project aimed at setting up community-supported schools using the STOP model which focused on the needs of war-effected children. This model has been piloted by Radda Barnen in their work with displaced Kabulis living in Peshawar. STOP is a conceptual model which helps parents to recognise the stress their children are facing as a result of war and find ways of dealing with it. STOP stands for S=structure, T=talk, O=Organised play and P=parental support. Training on the STOP model lasts for 3 days and is aimed at parents.

NCA/NRC, assigned two consultants to work on the development of this project. These were Bente Karlsen (Kindergarten and disabled teacher - 6 months) and Lisa Prois (Social Worker - specialist in child protection - 3 months). The project was designed in collaboration with Radda Barnen and had the following specific objectives:

→ To make parents aware of the impact of war on their children through STOP model training.

→ To assist parents, once they have received this training, to organise play and learning activities for their children with the minimum of external assistance.

The implicit goal of the project was to improve the well-being of children. This was to be achieved through the establishment of community-run activities which would form the basis of the formal education system when it was introduced. The project began in July 1994 after some delay and was funded for a two-year period. Project activities began in Laghman province in March 1995.

The project has been based in the Hesar-e-Shahi and New Hadda internally displaced camps outside Jalalabad city in Nangarhar province in Eastern Afghanistan and in Islamabad village in Laghman province. The camps were chosen because it was there that there was the greatest demand for education and where the UN agencies were prioritising assistance. In 1995, it was decided to compare the impact of the STOP model training in the displaced camps with that carried out in rural repatriation area. Islamabad village in Laghman province was chosen because this was an area where NPO/RRAA was already working.

The principal agencies involved in this project have been **NPO/RRAA, implementing agency, RBTU, key agency responsible for training** and **NCA/NRC leading donor agency**. Two other organisations have also made inputs into the project. These are **UNICEF** who have contributed school kits and **SCA** who have provided training for NPO/RRAA field workers.

initiated as a result of training inputs. No clear division of responsibility has been worked out.

Whether the trainers had either the needed background qualifications or were given sufficient backing and resources to carry out these extensive training activities was not assessed at any stage in the project. Nor was it recognised in any MOU or workplan that such a task should be carried out.

4.2. Actual Training Inputs

A summary of the actual number of training activities carried out since 1994 are listed in Appendix 5. The following is a brief description of the design of the different training sessions.

4.2.1. Training Design

RBTU and its trainers are responsible for the design and contents of the training sessions and all written training curricula used. Further training inputs for NPO/RRAA FWs are based on the training needs identified in the evaluation of previous SAT seminars. The design of all NPO/RRAA FWs training sessions are copied from the RBTU design slightly modified for the IDP camp context. These modifications are not documented.

4.2.2. Training at the Community Level

- *The STOP-seminars*

The outline of the STOP-seminar, which has been the same throughout the project, comprises the following components:

Step 1:: This includes an introduction of participants, voicing of their expectations, presentation of Rädda Barnen and the goal of the seminar, a session called " sharing of grief and sorrow". This is followed by brainstorming and open sharing of war experiences, an introduction to the CRC including group work to help participants identify and prioritize children's rights and discussion on how to ensure these rights are recognised. Finally the pamphlet with recommendations for parents on how to treat war affected children is presented.

Step 2: The STOP-sign model for intervention to assist the children is introduced and explained. Parents are also encouraged to describe their own observations of symptoms of distress in their children and are assisted in understanding the root causes. The responsibilities of parents are stressed and the importance of play for child development is discussed.

Step 3: Some general concepts such as community participation, community work and"self-help" are introduced, followed by group work exercise. The final session is about how to mobilise the community and is wrapped up by motivating the participants to line up for activities of their choice that they wish to start on a voluntary basis. The NPO/RRAA FWs assist the volunteers in registering the activity and providing them with attendance sheets and basic stationery.

The teaching methodologies used in these seminars are basically lecturing, brainstorming, group work and group discussion. The participants are male and female parents in separate groups of 30 in each. In reality many young people, who are not parents, are included. The participants are selected

from specific blocks in co-operation with the block leaders. The majority of the participants have been well-educated men and literate women.

The Committee Training

The Social Welfare Committee Training "package" is made up of two parts. One is the training, included in the Social Animation Training, which RBTU provides for NPO/RRAA FWs, and the other is the present seminar conducted by NPO/RRAA FWs for the committee members in the community. The concept of "Social Welfare Committees" is drawn from a working model used in the refugee camps in Pakistan in the joint UNHCR/CAR and RBTU community based social services programme.

The initial training sessions on the subject of committees were held by RBTU during the SAT-training in 1994.The design is a mix of sessions in "communication skills" and various subjects called"community participation/mobilisation" or " committee making". In April 1996 a "refresher course" was held for the NPO/RRAA FWs to enable them to run seminars on their own.

The 3 days seminar, held by NPO/RRAA FWs for male and female committee members, is more or less a copy of the RBTU design, which has been offered as a ready made package to the FWs, who, in their turn, have offered it to the camp community.

The design is the same for male and female committees. However currently there is a slight difference in how the idea is introduced to the committee members. The female section has shifted from the concept of Social Welfare Committees to Parents Committees and stress Parents(read mothers) role to promote the interest of their children. The male section see the Social Welfare Committee as an overall camp committee for all issues related to camp life and management. A complete design of the present committee seminar, including the various sessions and their components is described in Appendix 6.

The future committee members that is the seminar participants, are chosen after a "survey" visit by the NPO/RRAA FWs to 3 selected blocks. The block leaders, mullahs, headmasters and/or female volunteer teachers are asked to choose 10 men and 10 women from each block. The training is made on request by the block leaders, but objectives and contents of the training are not clearly presented during the survey. Criterion for a committee member which has been devised by RBTU/NPO/RRAA is to be: "an educated parent or other trusted and committed member of the community, who can convey a message." The majority of the selected members in Hesar-e-Shahi camp are highly educated persons such as teachers, ex-army officers or government administrators. Most of them are active as volunteer teachers for the non-formal activities.

4.2.3. Training for the NPO/RRAA Field Workers

The Social Animation Training (SAT) course intended to be one year course, started in September 1994. Due to project constraints mentioned above and in Appendix X, Project Chronology, only 30% of the planned course has been carried out so far. The sessions which are designed to be conducted one week per month in Jalalabad, have been outlined on an ad hoc basis. They are composed of a mix of subjects picked out from the curricula for the one year training of social animators in Pakistan. The main subjects covered so far have been: committee work, community participation, social animation and communication skills, needs assessment techniques, decision-

making and evaluation. The teaching methods used have been lecturing, group work and discussions. The theoretical input has not been linked to any practical field work in the training design.

The SAT training for 1996, now named Additional Training has been based on training priorities identified by the NPO/RRAA FWs. At their request it is planned to include the following topics: camp survey techniques, characteristics of a good community worker, training methodology, CRC, CBR, monitoring and evaluation skills, child-to-child and child development.

4.3. Observations on Implementation

The evaluation team only had the opportunity to observe one type of training which was the Social Welfare Committee Training. This was conducted by the NPO/RRAA FWs (and supervised by 2 RBTU trainers) in Hesar-e Shahi camp, block 16, 28-30 May-96. One female and one male seminar were observed. Through observations, interviews with trainers, trainees and various seminar participants the following key concerns have been identified in relation to training input:

4.3.1. Composition of training teams

The inappropriate composition of the training teams has lead to communication failures at all levels between RBTU trainers and the NPO/RRAA FWs and the community. These are also reflected in how the training has been designed and carried out.

The RBTU trainers who have been mainly responsible for the Jalalabad training had limited experience in designing a community work field work programme. Prior to becoming RBTU trainers, one was a kindergarten teacher and the other was a psychologist and both came from Kabul. These backgrounds would be adequate for planning and conducting training in psycho-social and play and learning skills. They designed the training programme based on earlier seminars in the urban refugee training programme in Peshawar. They were neither supervised nor given technical guidance on how to carry out a more specific assessment of training needs locally in the Jalalabad camps before or during the implementation of the various inputs.

The NPO/RRAA FWs were recruited by the NPO/RRAA Education Unit in Jalalabad. Candidates were requested to have a background as educationalists preferably with some field experience. All of the field workers, presently employed, are teachers or school managers by profession and from Kabul. None of them are presently living in the IDP camps nor have they been directly recruited from within the camp communities. They have had no earlier experience of working directly with communities.

4.3.2. Unclear objectives and ad hoc inputs

The failure to set clear and specific objectives for the whole project and its training inputs has lead to no clear roles or tasks being set for the NPO/RRAA FWs. It has thus proved difficult to design an appropriate training programme for them.

There is a considerable confusion about what is the main role of the NPO/RRAA FWs. It is not clear whether they are to be field co-ordinators of the educational activities or become community

workers in a wider sense. In the present workplan they also have a major task to perform in the role as trainers in the community.

As a result the issue of what skills are needed to perform what tasks has not been properly assessed and no comprehensive training plan has been developed. Needs are said to be assessed on a continuous basis in co-operation between RBTU trainers and NPO/RRAA FWs but end up in a rather ad-hoc design based on FWs own requests and available RBTU resources.

A good example of unclear objectives leading to a confused training design can be seen in the training of committee members. The objectives of these seminars seem not to be clear to any of the participants; neither to RBTU nor to FWs or the committee members to be trained. Concepts used are not well defined; the role of the committee is not task- oriented and as a consequence the necessary practical tools and guidance in how to organise a committee are never conveyed to the participants. The design has become an ad hoc mix of inputs on child development, CRC, parents' responsibilities and generalised concepts related to community needs assessment techniques and committee work. The outcome is that the discussion about committees has become irrelevant. The training sessions fail either to build on already existing structures, such as the Islahi - a council of elders - or the need to create a community-based network for the project activities.

In comparison, the STOP-seminars have more clearly defined and understood objectives and also a better and more comprehensive curriculum design.

4.3.3. Imbalance between theory and practice

One of the strengths of RBTU teaching methodology is that participatory methods, such as brainstorming, role play and group work are frequently used and encouraged. These methods are conveyed to the FWs mainly through observations and their own participation in seminars, where these techniques are used. However the NPO/RRAA FWs have not been given any specific training in participatory teaching or learning techniques. This is a skill, required by the FWs, which needs to be developed. There is still a prevailing tendency to use a top-down lecturing approach as a means of communicating with the community rather than acting as facilitators in a mutual learning process. This approach is most predominant amongst the male trainers whereas the females are more sensitive to the participatory teaching methods.

There is an imbalance between the theory input and the field practice particularly in SAT training and the Committee training. Case studies, based on real life or a camp situation, are not used in training exercises and no practical field work assignments are set. The follow-up of the various training sessions and/or seminars is not linked to previous sessions. Therefore it is not possible to crosscheck the level of understanding of the participants and to upgrade their skills gradually.

4.3.4. The CRC component in the training inputs

It is RBTU policy that a training component, conveying knowledge and raising the awareness of children's rights according to the UN convention, should be an integral part of all RBTU training. It is not an easy task to do this in a practical and culturally relevant way to people for whom this is a totally new and alien concept.

Methods have been worked out within RBTU on how to relate the main principles in the Convention to Islamic religion and culture. Materials have also been developed on how to use picture illustrations for illiterate participants.

From observations and interviews with participants there is a low level of understanding of how these concepts can be practically used. The NPO/RRAA FWs need to work on how these messages can be conveyed in a simplified and more culturally appropriate fashion.

4.4. Conclusions

① The STOP-seminars have, no doubt, had the most positive training impact. In interviews with parents, who have participated, they all agree that they have gained some important and useful knowledge from the seminars. There is still a low level of understanding of the STOP model and how it can be practically implemented. This training has had a strong emotional effect on many parents and helped them to alleviate the most immediate distress in their children. Basic awareness of children's rights has also been raised.

② As a tool for training the STOP-seminar, with its present design, should be seen only as an awareness-raising exercise. If used within a project context, it is to be viewed as an entry point for more targeted and in-depth knowledge input, where other organisational and social structures must be in place to develop the model further into more effective and long-term support mechanisms for families and children affected by war.

③ The Social Welfare Committee Training, with its present design, has had no visible positive impact up to now and has to be completely revised, if at all continued. The idea of training Social Welfare Committees with a vague overall role to deal with a variety of community development issues must be abandoned as being irrelevant to the present situation in the Jalalabad camps.

④ The Social Animation Training needs to be revised for similar reasons. A lot of time has already been wasted and lack of clear objectives for this training and a failure to adjust it to the project needs has limited its impact considerably. To become efficient this training should have been focusing on giving the NPO/RRAA FWs the necessary and practical skills needed to co-ordinate and facilitate the non-formal activities in the field.

5. IMPACT OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

5.1. Preconceived Ideas and Undefined Concepts

It is assumed in the Work Plan and all other project documents that the community will act in its own interest from instinct and out of a sense of moral duty. Thus "encouragement" and "animation" are the basic terms of reference used to describe what are the necessary pre-conditions for motivating the community.

It is also repeatedly stated in various documents and reports that the STOP-model is based on "community participation", "self-help" and "self-reliance". These concepts are not defined nor is there any description of how they will be applied within the project context. Non-formal activities are also referred to as "self-help activities" or "self-help" classes without any clear definition. "Self-help" seems to be a label for any activity which is run on a voluntary work basis and this indiscriminate use of the word creates confusion rather than helps in describing how activities are planned and run.

To help clarify the concepts and give more substance to the way they are used, it seems more appropriate to restrict the term 'self-help' to activities and projects, which have been developed spontaneously within the community from people's own conscious initiatives. When, as in this case, the project has been initiated from outside it seems more relevant to talk about levels of community participation, involvement or contribution (such as voluntary work, management responsibility etc) which the project has incorporated in it's implementation in order to enhance the community's capacity for management in the long run. The term 'self-reliance' in this context will then refer more to the long-term goal of the given assistance. What is said here it not to imply that the community was not active in selecting the activities they wished to run nor is to say that they were motivated to help themselves from the outset. Instead, it has been necessary to point out that the concepts used need to be defined within the project context.

There has been a failure in this project to conceptualise community involvement as a continuous process of dialogue between the community and the project implementers. By simplifying the issues and relating to them as theoretical ideas only, the project has failed to understand the underlying mechanisms and the necessity to approach the process with a coherent strategy and plan.

5.2. The Extent of Community Involvement in Project Planning

As already mentioned, formal education was the community's main priority. Teachers' expectations were that they would assist in starting the formal school following running non-formal classes on a voluntary basis. During this initial phase the community that is voluntary teachers and parents were actively involved in deciding what kind of activities they wanted to run and what was most suitable for their children and themselves.

The community were not involved in any real planning process and were only briefly consulted just before the STOP-seminars started. It is not very clear whether the level of support to be provided for the project was discussed with the community from the outset. It seems that they were informed that they would receive some stationery and materials which would be distributed by NPO/RRAA FWs assisted by RBTU.

5.3. Lack of Dialogue Between Project Workers and the Community

No dialogue on key issues was established with the community. This included no discussion of how responsibilities could be shared with the key persons in the community who were to run the activities. Communication was focused on the distribution of materials to the classes. The role of the NPO/RRAA FWs became that of supervisors and monitors of registration of activities, attendance and follow-up on material support given.

An opportunity to involve the community in a crucial issue at a critical point in the project's history was missed. This was when the formal school started and the Shura supported by UNICEF agreed to pay the teachers in kind - wheat rations - through the WFP Food for Work Programme. This decision was very discouraging especially for those volunteer teachers who didn't work in the formal school but who were educated teachers or kindergarten teachers. The policy of not supplying volunteer teachers with wheat rations was not explained.

At a later stage, NPO/RRAA applied to WFP for approximately 45 tons of wheat and this was then distributed. However there were no further supplies of wheat nor was there any discussion of why the wheat had been supplied. The failure to have a clear incentive policy has lead to misunderstandings and a breakdown in communication between the NPO/RRAA FWs and the community.

5.4. Lack of Co-ordinated Policy

The level of community participation, which could be achieved in the Jalalabad camp situation, is also dependent on external factors such as the overall policy of the Nangarhar Shura and UNOCHA which are trying to minimise all assistance for the displaced. This approach has actively discouraged the community from getting involved in any of the few community services programmes established in the camps. There has hardly been any co-operation or co-ordination between the various UN agencies and NGOs regarding common policy guidelines or programme implementation. This project seems to have overlooked these constraints and operated rather autonomously instead of adjusting strategy to the prevailing conditions. By doing so the project has fostered unrealistic expectations amongst the camp residents.

Given the circumstances, the commitment to the project shown by the participants is very impressive. It is remarkable since the community has been given sole responsibility to run activities without a clear policy for participation, One contributing factor is that education is a high priority to most of the concerned Afghan families.

5.5. Observations on Implementation

5.5.1. Failure to analyse socio-economic conditions

A failure to analyse and consider the changing socio-economic conditions for the camp community has led to false conclusions on the issue of incentives for the voluntary teachers.
Incentives have been seen as an obstacle for " self-reliance" rather than a justified input to ensure the survival of the volunteers and the sustainability of activities.

This omission is demonstrated in the conclusions of the Mini Survey carried out jointly by RBTU and NPO/RRAA in February 1996. Here one of the most urgent problems identified is how to motivate the volunteers to sustain their activities without any further material support either incentives or stationery. It is stressed that "dependency" must be reduced. Subsequent observations, interviews and a recent report by MSF Holland reveal that the economic status of residents of the camps has worsened in 1996 with the reduction in rations. Many families particularly in New Hadda are being forced to sell off their remaining possessions to buy food. Despite Food for Work schemes, IDP's economic status and food security is likely to deteriorate further in the future.

This problem of dependency was defined by the project staff in isolation from the community and reflected the priority of the project which was sustainability rather than the needs of the community.

5.5.2. Relationships with the Community

The relationship between the NPO/RRAA FWs and the community volunteers has been constructed around the role of the NPO/RRAA FWs as project workers who bring in resources and materials from outside the community. They have been seen as distributors and monitors of material support and as "inspectors". In this context, the community has adopted a passive role and has been led to expect external assistance.

This unequal relationship was reinforced by the fact that the NPO/RRAA FWs were not recruited or selected from within the camp community and didn't share the same conditions. In the initial stge of the project, they failed to communicate on an equal footing with camp residents. They also did not use the human and other resources in the community in a constructive way. As teachers and school managers, they have been most successful in creating links with other teachers and headmasters, and have managed to motivate these teachers to work as voluntary educators.

The concept of "social animation" has not been adequately understood. Social animation must come from within the community itself, even if encouragement and knowledge inputs come from outside. There has been a failure to recognise that social animation training should be given to key persons from within the community on the basis of their qualities as active and trusted members rather than to NPO/RRAA FWs. This has lead to no natural link being developed with the community.

5.5.3. The Role of Committees

The role of Social Welfare Committees or Parents Committees has been seen as a tool for community involvement. In the planned phase out, it will be the structure to which the management of activities will be handed over. In reality the problem seems to be that not many of these committees are functioning. As already stated there is confusion about the roles and tasks of the various committees.

When the IDP camps were set up in 1993-94, UNHCR tried to build on the traditional leadership structures, such as the Islahi and council of elders, to establish a base for communication between the agencies and the community. When UNOCHA took over the block leaders who were often appointed with consent of the Shura were given more power and control over food distribution. As a result of this change in policy and the high mobility of the population, the original committees were

dissolved in many blocks. In others, these traditional structures remained as the main decision-making and problem-solving bodies.

No assessment of the functions of these original structures has been made so that they could be incorporated into the project. Instead new concepts have been introduced from outside the community. The recent idea to restart the training and setting up of Social Welfare Committees and/or Parents Committees is questionable and exemplifies the lack of coherent community participation in the project. In observations carried out by the evaluation team, the NPO/RRAA FWs seem to be introducing the idea to the community without any prior consultation with their representatives about the objectives and tasks of such a committee.

5.5.4. Failure to develop networks

Throughout the history of the project the possibility of strengthening the informal networks between volunteer teachers and/or parents has not been identified or developed. There is scarcely any organised co-operation between these groups. Facilitating an exchange of ideas and experience across blocks or between camps would enhance levels of mutual support and co-operation in these networks. This would be a more realistic approach to getting women who have had no earlier experience of committee work, more involved in the co-ordination and management of the activities. Key persons, such as teachers in both formal and non-formal and the most active parents/volunteer could, for example, have been identified and trained in basic organisational skills.

5.6. Conclusions

① The failure to assess and analyse the socio-economic conditions in the IDP camps and the absence of a clear strategy for how to involve the community in the project has led to the crucial issue of community participation being neglected. It has been wrongly assumed that incentives create dependency and that lack of incentives stimulate "ownership" and "self-management" of the activities by the community. In the camp situation in Jalalabad the lack of incentives and other relevant inputs to strengthen the capacity of the volunteer teachers has created obstacles. These have caused activities to decline and community participation to dwindle so that it is unrealistic for activities to be handed over to the community at a later stage.

② Staff involved in project implementation have not been proactive in involving the community in the planning and decision-making processes. There have been no clear objectives nor any proper needs assessment for the training the NPO/RRAA FWs as " social animators". A top-down approach has been chosen instead of identifying and training key persons selected by the community. New and autonomous structures, such as the social welfare committees have been introduced rather than building on existing structures and networks within the community. This approach has led to a failure to strengthen and support the inherent human resources and development capacity of the camp community.

6. PROJECT MANAGEMENT

6.1. Planned Roles and Responsibilities of Participating NGOs

This project was designed by NRC/NCA after consultation with the residents of two blocks in the camp and a number of agencies including SCA, UNICEF and Radda Barnen. NPO/RRAA was not fully involved in the design or consultation phase. This is probably because prior to this project NPO/RRAA had no experience either in the education sector or in community development. Therefore, the work plan and the Memoranda of Understanding which set out the parameters of the project were the sole responsibility of NRC/NCA.

The 1994 work plan has been used as the key document which sets out the objectives and design of the project. The work plan is primarily a practical document. It stipulates the tasks that need to be carried out to establish the project in Hesar-e-Shahi camp. Attached to the work plan, is a diagram that graphically identifies the responsibilities of the different agencies in setting up the project.

The diagram clearly identifies which agency will be responsible for which tasks and what aspect of the project. It is a simple way to convey complex information quickly and easily. A copy is attached under Appendix 7. From the layout, one could assume that NRC/NCA were ultimately responsible for the implementation of the project since the agency is listed with its responsibilities in a special box at the top of the diagram. However this is not specifically stated.

There are a number of weaknesses in the diagram and the overall project design. These are:

→ the implicit goal or overall objective of the project - to improve the well-being of war-affected children - was never clearly stated and the specific objectives of the project were not linked to the achievement of this goal. As has been seen throughout this report, this lack of clarity at a global project level has affected the setting of objectives and indicators in every component of the project. No outputs/impact for the project were identified or indicators set to monitor the achievement of either the overall goal or specific objectives.

→ overall management responsibility for the project was neither identified in key project documents or clearly assigned to one agency. Instead **responsibility for individual components of the project management cycle** such as planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation were allocated to different agencies.

→ no formal co-ordinating structure or mechanism was established by which responsibilities and inputs could be planned and co-ordinated throughout the project.

The work plan was attached to the Memoranda of Understanding which were signed by some of the participating agencies. The Memoranda produced in 1994 again does not mention the overall objective of the project. Instead they list the responsibilities and tasks of each agency. There is no standard format for each memoranda so those for SCA and NPO/RRAA are detailed lists of responsibilities, descriptions of budgets and financial arrangements whilst that for Radda Barnen simply describes a sample STOP model course. These Memoranda are suitable as planning documents but not as useful management tools.

1.1. Socio-Political Background

The outbreak of fighting in Kabul in January 1994 created a new humanitarian crisis. Those people fleeing Kabul and seeking refuge in Pakistan, were prevented from crossing the border. Such large numbers of internally displaced people collected so rapidly in and around Jalalabad city that the authorities were forced to set up special camps.

At the height of the crisis, it was estimated that 260,000 displaced were settled in four camps around Jalalabad with 70,000 living in the city. With the scaling down of fighting in 1995, significant numbers have returned to Kabul city and the adjacent districts. UNOCHA estimates that there are now 14,017 families or 98,119 people living in Hesar-e-Shahi camp with 5,624 families or 39,368 people in New Hadda. More than 75,000 internally displaced people were registered as having returned to Kabul in mid 1995.

There are only a few similarities between the displaced and those living in Islamabad village. The level of education in Islamabad village itself seems comparable. There is a strong interest in education with a significant number of literate women and men and some men educated to professional level.

The most significant difference between the two communities is that the majority of the displaced in the camps have few income-earning opportunities in the immediate area. Some, for example, work as day labourers and others, if qualified, as teachers. In Islamabad village, agriculture is the main source of income for the majority, although there is not enough productive land to support the whole population. This has meant that one of the main sources of income for young men has been to become a mujahed with the local political party, Hezb-e-Islami. In addition, Islamabad village and the surrounding area have not been directly effected by war in recent past. Sixteen years ago at the outset of war, villages were bombed and shelled with families losing family members and property. The major problem facing the population is how to secure an income for those who cannot work on the land.

1.2. Constraints to Project Implementation

After an initial period when the displaced received full support, policy changed and the camps were intended to be only temporary. The UN, the NGOs and their donors could not financially support the displaced in the long term and did not wish them to settle. Therefore, camp management policy has had the implicit objective of providing the minimum of services and resources sufficient to meeting basic indicators.

Although the camps were originally established by UNHCR, UNOCHA has been responsible subsequently. UNOCHA has had limited operational experience in emergencies. Thus, there has been a failure to co-ordinate policies and services effectively in the camps.

The spells of fighting in Kabul which have alternated with intervals of stability have created a highly mobile displaced population. The level of security in each area and the possibility of earning an income to supplement rations are the main factors which cause people to move backwards and forwards between the displaced camps and Kabul. Displaced family members are left behind in the camps so as to be able to collect rations and look after tents and other possessions.

6.2. Management in the Initial Implementation Phase: July - December 1994

In the initial phase of the project, no agency was allocated overall responsibility for managing the project nor did any agency assume this overall responsibility. Instead a "pattern of management" developed in which responsibilities for certain aspects of planning and management were divided between NRC/NCA, Regional NPO/RRAA Office in Jalalabad and NPO/RRAA Education Unit. This allocation of responsibilities was not formally recognised.

The ostensible line management structure was that NRC/NCA had key responsibility during this period for financing the project and for planning, budgeting and monitoring. The Director of NPO/RRAA was responsible to NRC/NCA in executing the project according to the project description (set out in the work plan) and budget . In turn the Regional Office was responsible to the Director. The NPO/RRAA Education Unit set up to carry out project activities in the camps was established as part of this regional office. A special consultant based in NPO/RRAA Head Office in Peshawar and acting as the representative of the Director, was the link between the NPO/RRAA Regional Office and the NPO/RRAA Education Unit and NRC/NCA

In reality, during this period, this structure was not adhered to. NRC/NCA took the lead responsibility on planning and policy matters for example, negotiating with the Department of Education and UNICEF over their decision to support formal education in the camps. NRC/NCA and RBTU worked directly with the NPO/RRAA Education Unit. At the same time, they tried to encourage the NPO/RRAA consultant and Regional Director to take greater responsibility for the project by discussing and explaining the key concepts involved in the project.

The NPO/RRAA Education Unit took responsibility for carrying out day to day activities in the camps. NPO/RRAA Regional Office assumed responsibility for personnel management and office management including office space, transport and logistical support.

With the effective withdrawal of SCA and UNICEF and with the minimal role of WFP in the project, only three agencies, RBTU, NCA/NRC and NPO/RRAA needed to co-ordinate their work. During this period, they met a number of times although not on a regular basis and no policy decisions were discussed.

6.3. Subsequent Implementation: January-September 1995

The Memorandum of Agreement signed between the 3 remaining agencies, NRC/NCA, NPO/RRAA and RBTU is a more useful document than its predecessor. It clearly states the two main objectives of the project and introduces a third objective which is to enable NPO/RRAA Education Unit become effective community development workers. It assigns co-ordinating and facilitating responsibility for the whole project to NRC/NCA. There is still no mention of management responsibility.

In December 1994, NRC/NCA's involvement in the project was scaled down. It is stated in the work plan of 1994 that NPO/RRAA will begin implementation of the project. However there was no formal hand-over of the lead responsibility that had been undertaken by NRC/NCA previously. Reasons for this are unclear; possibly it was because NRC/NCA's role in the first phase of the project had never been formally recognised.

As preparation for undertaking project implementation, the education unit were to have been trained by SCA on how to run and supervise educational programmes. This training ultimately was mainly about teacher training and supervision in a formal school system. Much of which was already familiar to the members of the education unit who were either teachers or educational administrators. The training provided was inappropriate for two reasons. Firstly education management training for formal system was not relevant since NPO/RRAA would be, in the first part of the project, working with non-formal classes with a significant planned community involvement. Secondly, it failed to provide the FWs with basic management skills such as planning and allocating resources with which to manage the project.

In effect, the pattern of management altered. NRC/NCA tried to restrict their involvement to monitoring project performance. NPO/RRAA at all levels failed to recognise this change and did not take on responsibility either for overall management or project implementation. Instead there was an assumption that NRC/NCA and RBTU would intervene if problems arose.

A monitoring team from RBTU and NCA/NRC visited the project in March/April 1995. During this visit, they identified old and new problems that had arisen because of minimal management and planning. These included:

→ NPO/RRAA Education Unit lacked any understanding of the concepts on which the STOP model was based and the value of non-formal education. This was first identified in the Mid-Term Evaluation in 1994.

→ Non-formal classes were not operating on the scale previously reported due to a lack of planning and no coherent monitoring or support.

→ There was a breakdown in communication between the Education Unit and the administration of the NPO/RRAA Regional Office over use of resources such as vehicles for visits to Laghman province. Equally no decision had been taken to find additional staff to replace those either being trained in Peshawar or on maternity leave.

As a consequence of this visit, a work-plan for 1995 was then drawn up by NRC/NCA and RBTU in a workshop with the NPO/RRAA Education Unit and a letter sent to the Director of NPO/RRAA requesting him to ensure that the work plan was adhered to. It was only partly followed.

In this instance, NRC/NCA and RBTU were forced to intervene on a crisis basis and work directly with the Education Unit. The contributions of the NPO/RRAA consultant and the Regional Office seem even more limited than in the earlier phase. The NPO/RRAA consultant took part in activities which were initiated by RBTU and NRC/NCA but appears to have contributed little independently.

After this visit, no one in any of the 3 agencies involved appeared to question why problems were not being resolved or overcome. Equally no meeting seems to have been held between senior staff in the 3 agencies to review the recent progress of the project and suggest improvements or adjustments. Only limited action was taken to address these problems. One can assume that this was because of either lack of management capacity in the 3 agencies or the lack of clarity as to who had management responsibility or both.

6.4. The Failed Transfer of the Project to Kabul:

The decision to transfer the project to Kabul in August 1995 was appropriate in the circumstances at the time. Large numbers of displaced were returning to Kabul; the populations of the camps were declining rapidly. The improved security situation in Kabul had continued for some time and looked as if it would do so. The need for assistance for traumatized children in Kabul was self-evident. However the vacuum in management responsibility in the project meant that the process by which this transfer was carried out was mismanaged and was ultimately unsuccessful.

A collective decision was taken by the NRC/NCA, RBTU and NPO/RRAA consultant and the NPO/RRAA Education Unit to transfer the project to Kabul. Needs assessment and planning were carried out within a limited period. No-one including the NPO/RRAA Education Unit assessed what support as well as resources would be needed to set up the project nor how long it would take. More significantly, no-one considered the impact such a move would have on the existing activities in Jalalabad and Laghman province. The NPO/RRAA Education Unit itself failed to inform teachers and volunteers that they would be absent for an extended period.

The NPO/RRAA Education Unit failed to obtain permission to open a new programme in Kabul from the authorities. When the security situation deteriorated, the Unit were forced to leave Kabul having started no new activities. Only 20% of project activities reported in September 1995 in Jalalabad were assumed to be still operating on their return.

A joint meeting of RBTU, NCA/NRC and NPO/RRAA was held in December 1995 to decide how best the project should continue in the IDP camps and Laghman province after this disruption. This was an opportunity to review the progress of the project to date and identify what activities should be started and supported and what the roles of the different agencies should be. Although a survey was commissioned to look at the quality of activities undertaken, no exhaustive review of the programme was initiated.

6.5. Observations on Implementation:

Only NPO/RRAA Education Unit out of the whole of NPO/RRAA seems to have any commitment to the project. Admittedly the organisation was in crisis during the evaluation. However there appeared to be little interest in the project or awareness of the problems it is facing.

NPO/RRAA Education Unit was not perceived by itself or the Regional Office as an integral part of the NPO/RRAA Eastern Region Programme. Instead it was viewed as an adjunct of the regional office which was directly supported by NRC/NCA and RBTU. Only basic office management support was provided to the Unit by NPO/RRAA Jalalabad. The degree of external support appeared to have alienated the unit from the rest of the programme.

NPO/RRAA Education Unit staff members had useful insights into how the project could be improved. However they did not feel there was any structure or mechanism by which this could be communicated. Their reluctance to voice their opinions was in part due to the fact that all their contracts had expired at the beginning of the evaluation and they were uncertain if they would be renewed.

NCA staff responsible for monitoring the project correctly identified many of the problems facing the project. However it is not clear why no action had been taken to address these problems earlier.

There has been a complete lack of clarity as to who was responsible for the project overall and considerable misunderstandings about who should be responsible for what. NPO/RRAA Education Unit have seen themselves as being responsible for carrying out activities in the camp. Thereafter they were not clear about the division of responsibilities between NPO/RRAA Peshawar, NRC/NCA and RBTU. The NPO/RRAA consultant felt that the line management structure worked and seemed to be happy to share collective responsibility for direct interventions by NRC or RBTU. NCA/NRC saw themselves as donors whose main responsibility was monitoring project progress.

Informal exchange of information between 3 agencies appears to have taken place frequently and no one identified a need for more systematic co-ordination or communication.

6.6. Conclusions:

① This is an ambitious and complex project. It is ambitious because it planned to introduce new concepts and activities in a highly unsettled environment. It is complex because the project was to be implemented by 6 agencies ; only one of whom was familiar with the concepts on which the project was based. Only 2 of the agencies had experience of working in the education sector.

② Management of the project was very weak especially after the initial implementation phase. This was because there was no clarity as to who was ultimately responsible. This appears to have been both a function of weaknesses in project design and limited project management capacity in the 3 key agencies, RBTU, NCA/NRC and NPO/RRAA. This lack of clarity was exacerbated by specific responsibilities for planning or implementation of inputs/activities being shifted between agencies without formal agreement during the course of the project.

The marked weaknesses in the management of the NPO/RRAA Regional Office and in the management of the NPO/RRAA Education Unit forced RBTU and NRC/NCA to intervene directly. This meant that existing management structures within NPO/RRAA were bypassed. Although this intervention enabled the project to continue, it alienated the Education Unit from the NPO/RRAA Regional Office and undermined the latter's already minimal management capacity.

③ Communication between the agencies and between staff within agencies was very poor. This was in part due to the fact that no formal co-ordinating structure had been established. Communication seemed to take place on an ad-hoc basis and not all parties were always involved. In NPO/RRAA in particular, there was minimal communication between senior staff such as the Director of NPO/RRAA, the NPO/RRAA consultant and the NPO/RRAA Regional Director.

④ NPO/RRAA does not 'own' this project. This is due to both the conspicuous and direct involvement of RBTU and NCA/NRC in the project. In addition, NPO/RRAA has had limited experience in the education sector.

⑤ Monitoring and reporting systems were ineffective. They have not provided accurate descriptions and analyses of the progress of the project and the internal and external problems it has faced.

⑥ The consequences of ineffectual management and poor communication are that the extent of the failure of the project to meet even the specific objectives set out at the outset of the project has been not been recognised after the initial successful phase. Opportunities to improve the project and to adjust it to changed circumstances in the camps and elsewhere have thus been consistently missed.

7. SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

- The most successful aspects of the project have been the initial STOP model training carried out in 1994 in Hesar-e-Shahi camp and in 1995 in New Hadda camp and the literacy classes for women and girls and kodakistans that have continued to function.

- The STOP model was appropriate in the initial stages of the project because children were still suffering from the most immediate effects of war. Helping their traumatized children and providing an education for them were priorities for the community.

- Using the STOP model seminars as an entry point through which to establish these educational activities created an artificial link between the seminars and the non-formal educational activities.

- STOP model training can be only be used as an introduction to the effects of war on children. It does not provide knowledge on how to deal with traumatized children in the long term. It also does not contain any guidelines on how this introductory knowledge can be translated into guidelines for action.

- Another weakness of the STOP model is that it fails to identify the support that should be given to parents and other adult child caretakers who are working with war-affected children. The use of STOP model training should always in the future be accompanied by a psycho-social support programme for parents.

- The phased approach to the introduction of non-formal schooling prior to the establishment of formal schools was in principle correct for an emergency situation. However in this context, there was a Department of Education who could in theory with external support have set up formal schools from the time when the camps were set up. In addition, the community itself prioritised formal education over non-formal schooling. Any other non-formal classes should only have been established after needs assessment had been carried out and in those areas where it was necessary to complement the formal schools and meet the need for organised play activities for children.

- The flawed project design led to a failure to define objectives, roles and timescales at every level in the project. Thus the quality of the activities has been low.

- This weak design was exacerbated by poor management especially from 1995 onwards. A failure to allocate clearly overall management responsibility was compounded by a failure by the implementing agency to assume such responsibility. This omission stemmed from the agency's lack of ownership of the project and minimal project management capacity especially at the NPO/RRAA Regional Office and NPO/RRAA Education Unit level. The external agencies undermined this capacity by direct intervention in project activities and at the same time did not always ensure that project objectives were met.

- The level of community involvement in the project has been low. Community 'ownership' of the project is minimal. This is due to the fact the community was not fully consulted and involved in all stages of project development and implementation.

- The strategy for developing community participation in the project has been undermined by a

failure to carry out an assessment of the available resources in the community. This includes an analysis of the human resources including traditional decision-making structures and the financial base of the community. There has been no attempt to chart the changing socio-economic status of camp residents throughout the project so as to base any hand-over of activities on an accurate understanding of what people can afford to contribute.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1. STOP model training should be discontinued in all project locations. STOP model training was appropriate in the emergency phase to raise awareness about the effects of war on children and to provide basic guidelines on how such children can be cared for within the family.

8.2. The only aspect of the project that should be replicated is the use of STOP model seminar as an awareness raising exercise in an emergency. The knowledge incorporated in the STOP model could be used in other child-oriented projects.

8.3. Non-formal Maths and English classes should receive no further support. They do not have any educational value and merely divert resources that could be used for the formal system.

8.4. The objective of phasing out the project and handing it over to the community should be abandoned. Committee structures do not function, are not relevant to projet needs and should no longer be supported. In the current economic climate in the camps, parents and teachers cannot be expected to support activities with no salary or wheat rations.

8.5. The following training inputs should be discontinued: Social Welfare Committee training and Social Animation training for NPO/RRAA field workers.

8.6. A framework for extending the project for a further six months is outlined below. This framework constitutes the minimum requirements for ensuring that the well-being of participating children can be addressed through project activities. If these requirements cannot be met, the project should be terminated immediately. This is only an outline and should be developed further before implementation. This exercise lies outside the scope of this evaluation.

Suggested Framework:
The project focus for the next six months should be restricted to improving the quality of the non-formal educational activities where there is the greatest demand and level of community satisfaction. These were the literacy classes for girls and boys who are not enrolled in the formal schools and kodakistans.

The overall objective of continuing these activities for a further six months is to ensure the well-being of the participating children.

Four specific objectives:

→ improve teaching skills of teachers
→ ensure that play and child to child components are introduced and sustained
→ inclusive education of children with special needs
→ involve the parents in a better planned networking system in the best interest of the children.

Guidelines:
Guidelines and a set of standards to be followed for literacy classes and kodakistans (such as age range, no of children, length of lessons, breaks, opportunity for play etc) must be worked out and monitored

APPENDICES

closely.

Indicators:
The percentage of learning time spent in sitting/passive activities versus the percentage of time playing actively or carrying out interactive tasks.
Accurate attendance figures. .

Activities:
Training should be provided to volunteer teachers in four key areas:

→ literacy teaching skills
→ training in kindergarten skills(especially play and child stimulation),
→ training in the identification of children with special needs and children with disabilities. To include training in how to support these children within the classroom
→ child-to-child techniques.
→ introduce a set timetable or format for the kodakistans which would help ensure that key components such as play and singing are included.

This training must be practically applicable in the camp situation and all theory input must be followed-up by field practice and monitoring by skilled teachers.

The capacity of the volunteer teachers and parents to organise themselves into networks should be strengthened. The purpose of these networks would be to enable better qualified and experienced teachers to share their experience and practices with others.

- Material support for literacy/kodakistan teachers

→ wheat rations through WFP
→ stationery, suitable teaching materials, suitable resources for making teaching aides and toys on a regular basis.

Project management:
The overall project management responsibility for the continuation of this project must be clearly assigned to one agency. This agency must either have proven management capacity or be given the necessary staff and training resources to develop it so that they can competently support the extension of this project.

A formal co-ordinating structure should be established to ensure effective communication between the participating agencies. Agreement must be sought on the allocation of responsibilities between these agencies.

A clear monitoring schedule should be drawn up with agreed indicators and outcomes.

TERMS OF REFERENCE
NRC/RB EVALUATION OF LOLA PROJECT IN JALALABAD AND LAGHMAN

Background:

During the Winter Olympic Games in February 1994 fund were raised in a campaign called Lillehammer Olympic Aid (LOLA). Each of the five major humanitarian organizations in Norway received NOK5 million to spend on disadvantaged children and youth. NRC decided to use its part on education for children and youth suffering from the effects of war. Almost NOK3 million has been used in an education project for displaced Afghan children in Hisar-e-Shahi and New Hadda Camps outside Jalalabad, and in Islamabad village in Laghman Province.

The Project was planned by NRC in cooperation with the joint NCA/NRC office in Peshawar. In the planning process others were consulted, in particular the local education authority in Ningarhar, UNICEF, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, Radda Barnen Training Unit (Swedish Save the Children - SC/S - RBTU) and NPO/RRAA (Norwegian Project Office/Rural "Rehabilitation Association for Afghanistan). The project was discussed and coordinated with the Education Department of the province authority of the Ningarhar Shura, and at one point discussed with the newly appointed Minister of Education, (Professor Fazel).

Local education authorities were encouraged to put forward project proposal. When nothing materialized, NCA/NRC designed a two year project, which was approved in May 1994. (A condition of LOLA funding was that the money should be used within a two year period.)

The project had an initial planning, preparation and starting up period of six months. A team of two Norwegian consultants (already living in Peshawar) were hired for respectively one and six months, and they were succeeded by two Afghan coordinators. In June 1994 a project workplan, Play and Learning Activities, was ready. NPO/RRAA was selected as the Afghan NGO to implement the project.

The rationale behind the project workplan was that displaced children would benefit from organized activities that provide stimulus and structure to their everyday lives. Reference was made to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which grants all children the right to education as well as the right to play and recreation.

SC/S introduced the so/called STOP model (where S stands for Structure, T for Talking, O for Organized Play, and P for Parental Support) and it was decided to use staff from it's Training Unit to run courses among the IDP's to encourage self-help activities and to train the staff of NPO/RRAA that were to continue the training and the follow-up with support of activities. The training costs, salaries and allowances for RBTU trainers were met by SC/S, while NRC financed the remaining expenses.

The workplan identified four phases:

- the first was to carry out STOP model training in two of the camp's blocks;
- the second, to support resulting initiatives from the community;
- the third, to implement phase one and two in the rest of the camp (32 blocks);

The majority of the original camp residents were educated city-dwellers who were to find it difficult to adapt to a rural/semi-rural environment. Many did not have the skills to earn income in such a context. For example, many of those interviewed during the course of this evaluation were either army officers in the former government or administrators in the government. This has increased their dependence on external assistance.

This dependency has been further exacerbated by the inhospitable terrain in which both camps are sited. Hesar-e-Shahi, in particular, is sited on a stony arid plain with no natural shelter from trees or rocky outcrops.

The conservative outlook of the Nangarhar Shura, the local authority responsible for Nangahar and neighbouring provinces, has made it difficult for women field workers to work in the camp. In addition, some activities in Islamabad village were halted because of opposition from local mullahs.

1.3. Evaluation Methodology

This has been a final or summary evaluation aimed at assessing the impact of the project and assessing the extent to which it could be replicated elsewhere in other emergency situations. The Terms of Reference are listed in Appendix 1. These were drawn up by NRC Oslo and Peshawar and Radda Barnen Stockholm and Peshawar.

The evaluation was originally planned for Autumn 1995 but was delayed until mid 1996 because of delays in project implementation. The fieldwork for the evaluation of this project took place between 20th May - 5th June 1996. The evaluation team consisted of the following:

Ulla Blomquist - Radda Barnen Stockholm - Psycho-social needs of children, community issues and training inputs.
Farzana Amin - Afghan resource person
Dr Jalal Ahmad - Afghan resource person
Birdie Knightly - NCA/NRC Peshawar consultant - Team Leader, roles and responsibilities of participating agencies, community issues and the formal and non-formal education system.
Sayed Ibrahim Abdali - Afghan resource person
Mariam Fariwar - Afghan resource person.

The team used three methods of data collection; semi-structured interviews, direct observation of project activities including Social Welfare Committee training and a review of relevant project documents. Checklists were drawn up for interviews of parents, headmasters and teachers and children. See Appendix 2. Specific observation sheets for the project activities were also prepared. See Appendix 3.

Interviews were conducted both with individuals and with groups in these blocks. More individual men were interviewed than women since women were rarely alone in the tent. Interviews were conducted in the shelters used for schools and in tents inside people's compounds. The selection of individuals and groups was determined by:

→ availability
→ known participation in the STOP seminar

- and the fourth, to encourage transition to formal schooling in connection with the start of the new school year in September 1994.

In October 1994 a mid-term evaluation was made by NCA/NRC, SC/S and NPO/RRAA. Recommendations were followed by more advanced training from RBTU towards the NPO/RRAA staff. A pilot project was then done in a rural village in Laghman, suppose to house a number of displaced people from Kabul. The aim was to compare the acceptance and results of a STOP model training between a camp population and permanent settlement.

As the IDP's started to return from the camps to Kabul during summer of 1995, reducing camp population considerably within a few months, steps were taken to shift the project to Kabul. A joint team from NCA/NRC, NPO/RRAA and RBTU visited Kabul to meet with Ministry of Education and Ministry of Rehabilitation, Mayors office, Wakile Gozars (City Zone Administrators), NGOs and UN Agencies. Everyone welcomed the project, UNCHS/Habitat invited the organizations to use their neighbourhood network. An agreement was then made between the organizations for shifting of the project, and a new division of responsibility. NPO/RRAA established themselves with an office in Kabul, and their education staff was shifted from Jalalabad to Kabul.

Due to lack of permits, and the fact that renewed fighting in Kabul reversed the IDP's movements, NPO/RRAA staff shifted back to Jalalabad in November 1995 and restarted their presence in the camps.

Purpose of Evaluation

The decision to make an evaluation was already taken at the planning stage, with the overall purpose of examine and analyze the roles of the parties of the project and examine the future directions of the project, if to be continued, and in what form. Access the viability of replicating the STOP model elsewhere in Afghanistan.

The evaluation (or materials based on it) is intended as a means:

a) of reflecting on the strengths and weaknesses of the STOP model as used within the LOLA project in Jalalabad and

b) of spreading the use of the STOP model in NRC, Radda Barnen and other organizations.

It is also intended to contribute to the development of community-based methods for providing education activities in emergency situations that promote the psychosocial well-being of uprooted children.

The Task

The four first points below form the backbone of the evaluation. Under each of them are listed several questions from which the evaluators could select. Included within each question is an assessment of impact. The fifth point concerns the future scope, focus and also includes recommendations emerging from the evaluation.

Special attention should be given to the situation of girls and women and to what degree they have been involved. What, if any, influence did the project have on their situation? Attention should also be given

to the involvement and effects on children with disabilities and different age groups of children.

Key factors that affected the project from outside (population movements, policy decisions by authority, organizational capacity etc) should be mentioned.

1. Assess and document the STOP model as a means of mobilizing internally displaced people to start up activities in an unsettled camp situation. The aim of starting up these activities with and for children is to promote their pschosocial well-being.

   - To what extent was the STOP training given helpful in meeting childrens' needs?
   - How did the STOP training affect relationships between different groups in the community in particular parent and child and children to children?
   - How has the STOP training, including activities resulting from it, affected the psychosocial well-being of the children? Was there adequate follow up after the training, in particular concerning promotion of parental co-operation, and the best interest of the child?
   - What types of training did RBTU provide to NPO's field staff at different levels, eg. animators, social welfare committees (male and female) and what aspects of work/participation were conveyed through these trainings?
   - What organised activities for children resulted from the STOP seminars? How many children involved in what? What was the motive behind starting up activities?
   - How were teachers selected for the self-help classes? What qualifications were demanded? What is the turnover of teachers? What reasons are given for stayng/leaving? How was remuneration agreed upon? Who was responsible?

2. Discuss how the informal education activities that were promoted relate to the formal schooling and assess how the project has affected the displaced children's access to education throughout the history of the project.

   - Describe the relationship between informal and formal education activities in the camp and assess the level of co-operation between individuals involved in either area.
   - What affects did the STOP seminar and emerged activities have if any on the setting up of formal schools in the camp? Has any training, similar to the STOP model, been provided by the project for the teachers in the formal system?
   - What proportion of children in the camp are attending what? Can one child be involved in both formal and informal activities?
   - What kind of relationship does the project have with the education authorities? Were any mechanisms established for contacts between the informal and formal activities in the camp during project inception and during implementation?

- How are the 'self help' schools organised and how well do they function? Who is responsible for what? Analyse teaching methods, syllabus and teaching aides.

- How do parents view the formal education as compared with informal activities (self-help) classes?

3. Examine and analyse the roles, responsibilities, functions and obligations of NCA/NRC, RBTU, NPO/RRAA, UNICEF and SCA within the implementation process.

- What was the level of understanding among and support by the participating agencies for the objectives of the project?

- Was there a clear division of roles and responsibilities among the participating agencies? Has it been effectively communicated to the field staff of the respective agencies?

- To what extent have these roles and responsibilities been fulfilled?

- To what degree has the implementation and expansion of the training programme been in conformity with the NCA/NRC workplan of June 1994? Have the objectives set out for introducing the STOP model been met? If not, why? Has the plan been superseded by subsequent workplans - agreed or otherwise?

- How have efforts to expand part of the project to Kabul affected activities in the camp? Who was involved in making the key decision to deviate from the workplan? What were the consequences? What was the role of RBTU?

- What management and technical capacity did NPO have to supervise and monitor the implementation of the project at camp level/provincial level and to ensure sustainability?

4. Identify the extent of the community involvement in the activities and the communities ability to sustain actions.

- To what extent has the community been able to decide on what kind of activity was suitable for their children? Who was making the decisions about timing and venue for the activities? What was the cultural relevance of these activities?

- What is the level of cooperation between volunteers running the activities and parents? What is the role of the parents in activities?

- What kind of relationship has the NPO field staff developed with the community?

- How do NPO field staff view community role/involvement in the project?

- What is the community potential for sustaining the activities when the funds dry up?

- Has there been any mechanism developed for phasing out? What will be the community reaction?
- What effects will the termination of the project have? How will the sustainability of present activities be affected if at all?
- Clarify the meaning of self-help, voluntary, formal and informal education activities for the different agencies involved and for parents and voluntary workers.
- What activities generated by STOP seminar training have continued as opposed to those who have failed? Analyse these and possible reasons for the same?

5. Recommendations on:

- What was the impact of this project on the well-being of children, their families and the wider community?
- What are the experiences gained from this project that could be replicated in a community based humanitarian assistance programmes elsewhere?
- When and how should STOP model training be used? What are its strengths and weaknesses?
- What lessons were learnt about starting up basic education activities for children displaced by war and living under refugee conditions?
- Any need to continue STOP seminars? If so, in what form and for whom?

CHECKLIST FOR INTERVIEWING TEACHERS, HEADMASTERS, BLOCKLEADERS OR OTHER COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Objectives:

☞ to find out about the level of participation of the community in preplanning and implementation of the activities and what are their own priorities.

☞ collect information about the structures for decision making in the community.

☞ to discuss the meaning and relevance of self-help in the IDP-camp context

1. How many people and who are involved in decision making/problem solving concerning the whole population of the block? Is there a council of elders, are there any section leaders, other committees or non-formal structures?

2. Were you involved in the planning of the non-formal or formal education programme? Were you consulted in this block about your own priorities/needs in this block? What were you expectations when the activities started.

3. How do you identify a formal school? A non-formal school? What are the differences? Is a non-formal school a continuation of a home school/tuition tradition?

4. How is the supervision of the educational activities carried out by the Shura?

5. Did you participate in any seminar for social welfare committee/parents committee? If yes, how have you been able to use what you learnt? If there is a committee in your block, what has it achieved?

6. Can you make an estimation of how many children in this block go to the formal schools and how many participate in the non-formal activities, boys and girls respectively.

7. Can you make an estimation of how many people in this block have an income beside the wheat rations? How many participate in the WFP Food for Work programme?

8. Are there many families who are presently leaving the camp for the summer to go to Kabul? If not what is keeping them here? Are their families in your block who come from other areas/provinces than Kabul?

9. What is the meaning of the word "self-help" to you? What is motivating you to continue running activities on a voluntary basis?

FAMILY INTERVIEW CHECKLIST

Objectives:

☞ To find out about the basic living conditions of the families and their ability to participate in the project.

☞ To establish the level of understanding of the TOP model and the objectives of the project.

☞ To discuss if and how the families have either gained or benefited from the activities and their readiness to contribute in the future.

Section 1: Checklist for interviewing parents (male and females)

1. Family history::
   - Name of head of household/name of spouse
   - Profession/level of education
   - Number of members living in household
   - Number of children and their age and sex
   - Area of origin/date of arrival in camp/earlier displacements/movements
   - Source of income (number of income earning members of family)
   - Loss of/separation from close family members due to war situation?

2. Do families living in this block come from the same area? Do you cooperate and help each other?

3. Have you taken part in a STOP seminar for parents? Yes (when) .... No (why not) ....

4. What do you remember from the seminar?

5. Are your children taking part in these activities and what activities?

6. What changes have you observed in your family since the STOP seminar or the activities started?

7. Does the group leader/teacher visit you or your family if your child is absent from the activity? What kind of relationship do you have with the group leader? What kind of assistance can you seek from him/her?

8. Have you participated in any other training provided by NPO such as social welfare committee or parents committee training?

9. Are you presently a member of any committee? If yes, what do you see as the role of the committee? What are your tasks as committee member and how were you selected?

10. Are you familiar with these kind of committees or structures from before you came to this camp?

11. From what you have learnt in this project, what would you use in the future?

Section 2: CHILDREN'S INTERVIEW CHECKLIST
(to be used for boys and girls from 9-10 years and above)

* To find out the children's daily routine and what they are expected to accomplish in an average day
* To find out children's own perceptions of the activities they are involved in.
* To find out what adult support the children receive from outside the family.

1. Make a daily activity sheet together with the child beginning from first light to sleep.

2. What do they enjoy doing most in the day?

3. Do they attend the formal school and what grade? If not, can they give a reason why?

4. What other classes/activities do they take part in? How often do they attend? Have they been able to attend classes regularly and carry out their other obligations?

5. What have they learnt, if anything, from the class? Has this been new to them?

6. Are the they given any opportunities to play before, during or after classes?

7. Are they given any specific task to assist the group leader in running the classes such as keeping the environment clean?

8. Have they been taught any health messages (such as how to stay clean, keep away from disease or accidents) which they are passing on to other children in the family or neighbourhood?

9. If they have a problem, who would they turn to for help?

10. Can they describe how their life has changed since they came to the camp?

Non-Formal Education Classes: ACTIVITY OBSERVATION CHECKLIST

Objectives:

- ☞ to observe what the children/students are learning/doing in the activity;
- ☞ to establish what methods and materials are used and how participants cooperate;
- ☞ to discover how active the students are in the activity and how they benefit from it.

Camp .... Block .... Male or Female section ....
Type of activity .... How often and what hours is the activity running?
No. of participants: Total .... boys ..... girls .... age distribution ....
Date of start of activity .... Interruptions of activity: yes/no .... reasons ....

Points for Observations:

1. Describe the ongoing activity that is taking place in front of you.

2. What are the children doing?
   - are all children involved?
   - are there children being passive or left out?

3. Describe what materials the children are using.

4. Describe the interaction between the group leader/teacher and the children. For example, is the group leader/teacher helping the children? Do the children feel confident in asking him/her for help?

5. Describe the interaction between the children. Do they all understand one another? Are older children helping younger children? Are children sharing materials/toys amicably?

6. Describe the children's appearance. Are the children clean and well-cared for? Do the children appear healthy? Do you see any child with disability participating?

7. Describe the environment in which the activities are taking place. Is the area sheltered? Is the space keep clean and are there mats to sit on?

8. Is the activity area organized and relevant materials - toys, alphabet charts etc. - displayed so students and children can use them?

9. What background/level of education does the teacher have? How does he/she monitor attendance? Cooperation with parents? What kind of training/other support has he/she received from the NPO field workers? When was latest follow-up visit?

CHRONOLOGY OF PLAY AND LEARNING ACTIVITIES PROJECT, INTERNALLY DISPLACED CAMPS, JALALABAD

JANUARY-JUNE 1994:

Norwegian Project Office previously part of NCA/NRC becomes an independent Afghan NGO, NPO/RRAA.

Massive influx of people fleeing fighting in Kabul.

NRC receive LOLA funding for education for refugees and displaced which will encourage repatriation.

NRC/NCA hire a consultant to work on project design.

June 1994: Project design completed and negotiations with other agencies SCA,RBTU, NPO complete. UNICEF did not agree to sign contract.

July 1994: First STOP seminars run by RBTU in Hesar-e-Shahi camp.

August 1994: NPO Education Unit expanded from 4 staff members to 8 as neither RBTU or Education Unit able to keep up with the demand for STOP model training or support new activities being established.

September 1994: Social Animation Training (SAT) training started for NPO fieldworkers to tackle low level of communication skills and understanding of community development.

October 1994: First evaluation - Mid-Term Evaluation - conducted and statistics on attendance collected. The project is seen as being highly successful. The Department of Education and UNICEF open formal schools throughout the whole of Hesar-e-Shahi camp. Second SAT training conducted by RBTU.

November 1994: UNICEF agrees to continue supporting non-formal classes including kodakistans through donation of classroom, school and student kits.

December 1994: External consultant leaves NCA/NRC and responsibilities shifted to new team. Nangahar Shura introduces ban on women working or on women activities. STOP model training for men completed in 39 blocks in Hesar-e-Shahi camp. Training for women still to be completed in 8 blocks. Decision taken to expand activities into New Hadda camp. SCA carry out one week's training with NPO education unit staff.

January 1995: STOP model training begins in IIRO section part of Hesar-e-Shahi camp.

February 1995: 2 women fieldworkers leave for 3 month IRC kindergarten training course in Peshawar. 1 other women fieldworker leaves on maternity leave. NPO Education Unit is reduced to 1 woman fieldworker and 4 male fieldworkers.

March 1995: STOP model training begins in 2 blocks in New Hadda camp and Islamabad village, Laghman. Visting team from NCA/NRC and RBTU learns of problems faced by NPO Education Unit including understaffing, lack of work plan for 1995 and lack of co-ordination between the Unit and the Regional Office. Monthly reports on attendance figures not being submitted by NPO Peshawar to NRC/NCA and RBTU. NPO report that activities in Hesar-e-Shahi camp "in the verge of collapse".

April 1995: NRC/NCA and RBTU draw up 1995 workplan with NPO to ensure activities in Hesar-e-Shahi camp are followed up. To assess state of activities in the camp, team visits 37 out of 39 blocks. Appilication submitted for Food for Work to WFP.

May 1995: Social Welfare Committee training started in Hesar-e-Shahi camp and then stopped because of ban on womens' activities. It was decided not to continue with mens' committee training if the women were not able to participate.

June 1995: Nangahar Shura reimposes ban on womens' activities in the whole of Eastern region. Womens' activities in the IDP camps and Laghman province halted.

July 1995: A meeting to discuss transferring the programme to Kabul was held in NPO office. First wheat rations distributed by NPO staff to teachers of non-formal activities still resident in Hesar-e-Shahi and New Hadda camps. The population of both camps drops dramatically as people are encouraged to return to Kabul.

August 1995: Two staff members from NPO accompany NRC/NCA staff to Kabul to meet possible partner agencies and identify areas where the programme can be started.

September 1995: All 8 members of the Education Unit moved to Kabul to start up the programme. Teachers of non-formal activities in IDP camps were not informed about planned transfer or sudden absence of NPO Education Unit.

November 1995: NPO Education Unit unable to begin activities in Kabul because of outbreak of fighting and failure to obtain permission to operate. NPO Education Unit return to Jalalabad. Non-formal activities have declined by 80% in their absence.

December 1995: A meeting of 3 key agencies held to discuss future of programme. It was decided that NPO should distribute stationery and then carry out a survey to discover what percentage of activities were still operating. A monitoring form to be used by NPO Education Unit devised.

January 1996: Report submittted indicating that only 20% of activities still functioning. RBTU trained NPO in evaluation techniques and needs assessment.

February 1996: Qualitative assessment of programme carried out by joint team from NRC/NCA and RBTU and NPO. Findings indicated that activities were increasing now that NPO staff were visiting the camps more regularly but the community was 'dependent'on NPO. This was seen as an obstacle to handing over the programme to the community. The head of the NPO Regional Office dismissed over thefts from education store in Jalalabad office.

March 1996: New STOP model training with methods aimed at illiterate participants begun for women

→ group leader of a specific activity
→ parent of a child participating in activity

A few non-participating families were interviewed. Approximately 50% of the blocks in Hesar-e-Shahi and New Hadda camps were visited. Blocks visited included 4, 5, 12, 13, 15-17, 20, 24, 32, 35 and 37 and the IIRO camp in Hesar-e-Shahi and blocks 1,2,3,6,9 and 10 in New Hadda. The criteria used to select blocks for visiting included:

→ Those chosen by NPO/RRAA field workers for routine project activities such as surveying prior to committee training.
→ Those which were supervised by different NPO/RRAA field workers so there could be a comparison of the degree of support provided by different members of the team.
→ Blocks where there was a known history of either ongoing activities or failed activities.
→ Blocks on the periphery of the camp and which were known to have people from different districts outside Kabul or from neighbouring provinces.
→ Blocks where committee training was taking place

20 classes/activities were observed and 55 interviews were carried out in Hesar-e-Shahi. In New Hadda camp, 9 classes were observed and 24 interviews conducted. Some of these were individual interviews with block-leaders and headmasters whilst others were conducted with groups of teachers and parents. In Islamabad village, 3 classes were observed and 21 interviews were conducted of which 4 were with children. Over 200 adults and children are estimated to have been interviewed.

The team faced a number of constraints. It was not possible to see the project activities which include non-formal classes in Maths, English and Religious studies operating normally. This was because the project activities are wholly dependent on the schools for space and teachers and the formal schools had closed by mid May. The team was only able to visit those classes which were running inside teachers' compounds. The majority of these were those run by women and included Literacy classes for girls and women and kindergartens or kodakistans.

The team was also not able to interview all the key project staff. Those not interviewed were the previous Head of the NPO/RRAA Regional Office in Jalalabad, a former member of the NPO/RRAA Education Unit and the former NPO/RRAA Education Unit manager. All three had been dismissed by NPO/RRAA between March and April 1996 in connection with a burglary from the Education Store in Jalalabad

in New Hadda camp. The manager of the NPO Education Unit plus 1 other male fieldworker dismissed in connection with the thefts in the Jalalabad office.

April 1996: RBTU draws up 1996 workplan with NPO Education Unit. One member of the NPO Education Unit made Acting head.

May 1996: NPO Education Unit staff contracts expire. Evaluation begins.

Training implemented to date:

STOP-seminars:

In 1994: approx 1000 (not verified)parents (male and female) participated. All blocks (except 6 for females) in Hesar-e-Shahi were covered. Implemented by RBTU, July- September, and by NPO October- December)

In 1995: 262 females in Hesar-e-Shahi, 136 (male and female) in IIRO camp, 600 (male and female) in New Hadda and 120 (male and female) in Islamabad village, Laghman province. Implementation by NPO FWs. Female seminars stopped from June-95

In 1996: approx 300 females to be trained in New Hadda camp

Social Welfare Committees:

In 1994: no committee training

In 1995: 2 seminars for 120 participants (male and female) in Hesar-e-Shahi. Implemented by RBTU with NPO as observers.

In 1996: 3 seminars in Hesar-e- Shahi for 180 participants(male and female) to date. Implemented by NPO and supervised by RBTU. Committee training is planned to continue in Hesar -e-Shahi camp blockwise on request during 1996.

Social Animation Training and other training input:

In 1994: 4 days of training per month from September to December. Carried out by 2 RBTU trainers

In 1995: 5 days seminar on disability (by RBTU), 5 days training in management and evaluation techniques (by SCA) and 4 months training in Kindergarten skills (held by IRC for 2 of the female NPO FWs)

In 1996: 5 days seminar in January on evaluation, project survey and a refresher course on the STOP-model (including new materials to use for illiterate participants) (held by 1 RBTU-trainer)

3 days seminar in April on Social Welfare Committees (held by 2 RBTU trainers)

The Design of the Social Welfare Committee/Parents Committee Seminars run for the Community by NPO FWs and supervised by RBTU

A 3 days seminar running from 2-5 p.m.

Day 1:
- informal introduction of the participants
- introduction of Rädda Barnen as an international NGO and presentation of the RBTU/NPO activities
- CRC, an introduction, a brainstorming exercise on "what are the children'needs and rights" followed by group work using pictures as illustrations

Day 2:
- community needs assessments, lecture on some general methods and techniques such as the project cycle, questionnaires, observations and report writing (no practical exercises were used)
- problem-solving and encouraging self-help, some points on their importance

Day 3:
- importance of the Social Welfare Committees or Parents Committees. Lecture on what is a committee by various definitions, proposal from trainers to the participants to form a committee. Then presenting main responsibilities of a committee (in general terms and basically referring to an overall welfare committee), group work and presentation by the participants
- short lecture on child development and the responsibilities of parents, followed by group discussion

Before closure of the seminar group evaluations are made blockwise. Participants fill in a "volunteer sheet" and are enlisted by NPO as committee members. They are advised to appoint a chairperson and a deputy and to hold regular meetings every two weeks. The idea is that the FWs will follow up the committee training by attending their meetings in connection with monitoring visits to the blocks.

NCA/NRC
Director/Prois
Consultant/Karlsen & Ehsan

Finance play and learning activities.
Project planning and budgeting
Project monitoring
Negotiating with local authorities
Place order material
Report to LOLA

Contract Implementing Project	Contract Implementing Project	Letter of Understanding	Letter of Understanding
SCA Contract Bjorn Hagen	NPO Contract K. Salimi	Save the Children Sweden J. Person	UNICEF Alan Brody
Regarding: Participate the STOP course Discuss with target group Implement activities phase 3/4 Train NPO Permit to transport equipment to Jalalabad Supervise teachers Monitor programme 95	Regarding: Participate the STOP course Discuss with target group Follow SCA in implementing activities Employ 3-4 persons for teaching programme. To be trained for education programmes and to attend SCA's Teacher Training Programme: Dec. 1994 - Feb. 1995 Responsible implementing from 1995	Regarding: Organizing STOP sign Model Course in Sar-Shahi Camp Evaluating the course, initiative and activities in phase I, II and III Financing the STOP sign Model Course	Regarding : Coordinating the process Negotiating authorities Financing and constructing shelters WFP: Food for work for the teacher Shura of Ningarhar Education Dept. rep. by Regarding: Acceptance of the model for implementing activities.

2. IMPACT OF PROJECT ON PSYCHO-SOCIAL WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN:

2.1. Background to STOP Model

RBTU pioneered the use of the STOP model in its work with new refugees from Kabul in Peshawar in 1992. Many of these refugees were professionals and were concerned at their inability as parents to find ways of alleviating the distress their children were suffering as a result of the war in Kabul. Typical symptoms of this distress were uncontrolled crying, startle reactions, prolonged fear, withdrawal or outbursts of agitation, eat and sleep disturbances. These parents then turned to RBTU for assistance in helping their children.

RBTU looked for a working model which would be suitable to reach out to "a large number of refugees in a situation with no or very limited psycho-social resources available" (see RBTU report "The Background for RBTUs Work with War Affected Children, January-95"). The STOP-sign model was chosen to be included in a basic training package for parents and other resource persons, which was later tested and discussed with refugee parents in Peshawar. RBTU also developed a pamphlet providing them with some advice on how to behave in support of their children when showing symptoms of distress.

2.2. Planned Implementation

In the design and planning of this project, there were a number of weaknesses which were to limit the project's effectiveness in meeting the pschyo-social needs of children. There was a failure to state explicitly that the aim of the project was to improve the well-being of war-affected children. Instead the objectives of the project were defined as implementing the STOP model seminar, the setting up of formal and non-formal education activities and encouraging community participation. The project was to be implemented in four phases culminating in the establishment of formal schools. The assumption was that if these objectives were met, the well-being of children would be improved.

How these specific objectives were related to one another was also not well planned. Parents of war-affected children were to be the target group for the STOP-seminars. These parents, through messages conveyed in the seminars, would be motivated to run activities for their own and other children in the IDP camps on a voluntary basis. It was assumed that parents having acquired knowledge from a 3 day STOP seminar would then be equipped to organise and run activities for children which would meet their psycho-social needs. NPO/RRAA education unit would provide support in the initial stages and educational supplies and other materials.

There was also a failure to define and prioritize needs. Nowhere in the project documents nor in the background information on the STOP model are war-affected children specifically defined. Instead they are described only in general terms, "children in emergencies such as armed conflict and/or natural disasters". Nor is there a more detailed description of the beneficiaries of the project, the displaced children in the Jalalabad camps. As a result any set of standards referring to the well-being of the displaced children, and what the project wants to achieve in this concern, has been left out.

Finally, the project was designed only to meet those described war effects which are the most

immediate reactions of children and which will normally last for a few months after a traumatic event. The RBTU pamphlet designed to be used together with STOP model training states that children, who show more severe and prolonged reactions, need more individual attention and care.

2.3. Actual Implementation

2.3.1. Appropriateness and relevance of the STOP model

The STOP model has been perceived as a project model rather than a conceptual model. This model summarizes, in an easily understandable fashion, the main psycho-social components which need to be included in assistance provided to children in a war situation. The STOP elements: Structure, Talking, Organized Play and Parental Support are useful tools for meeting the needs of a child to find a way out of chaos and restore a sense of security and normalcy in the daily life structure. The support indicated basically has to be provided by parents or other adults, such as relatives, teachers or neighbours, who know the child well enough to be sensitive and alert to needs expressed by the child.

The STOP model as such gives only a basic knowledge input. It is also mentioned in the document on the principles of the STOP-model (by Lars H. Gustafsson) that special support and training of caretakers will be needed and that each programme or part of programme which is implemented for war-affected children, has to be part of a more concerted and long-term plan of action. In the project activities, no mechanism has been developed to transfer the principles of intervention into practical guidelines and minimum standard requirements to ensure that the activities initiated by the seminars would promote the well-being of participating children. Throughout the project only the quantity of the ongoing activities has been used as indicator of performance rather than any monitored change in the well-being of children

2.3.2. Relevance of the STOP model in 1994:

In the early stages of the project, especially before the formal school started, there seems to have been a direct link between the STOP-seminars, the initiated activities and the well-being of those children who were involved in the activities.

The effectiveness of STOP model training in encouraging parents in the Jalalabad camps to start a number of activities for the children in their block on a voluntary basis was also noted at the time in the Mid-Term Evaluation(October-94) and the Listening Survey (August-94).

At this stage the camp population was given external support by the agencies to meet their basic needs and full food rations and basic health services were provided for them. Idleness and lost hopes for future betterments in the camp situation were not yet an issue. The children were having a hard time to adjust to the new, harsh environment. They did not have any opportunity to play or to socialize with families and neighbours as they were used to in Kabul. All observations and interviews with parents and teachers confirm that children's behaviour at this time was"getting out of their control". The elders expressed their worries about children roaming around and fighting with each other.

In this situation, the STOP-seminar met the urgently felt needs of the parents by raising their

awareness and creating an understanding of the root causes of their children's behaviour. Encouraged by the seminars many parents were willing to organise recreational and learning activities because they had a clear motive. A majority of them were already teachers by profession who responded by taking on responsibility for education in the community before the formal schools were opened.

Interviews with participants in the STOP- seminars confirm that participating families have benefited from what they learned basically in two ways:

→ the parents seem to have begun to treat their children with more tolerance and acceptance
→ the activities provided the children with a daily structure, which was an important tool in creating normality and helping the children to socialize in a more organized way and under adult supervision.

2.3.3. Relevance of STOP in 1996

The conditions in the camps have changed dramatically over two years and the problems facing children are different. In this context, the STOP model is no longer appropriate.

Elders, leaders, teachers and parents now confirm that the majority of children in the camps no longer show the symptoms they did earlier. Most families in the camps have been settled there for two years or more. People, who move into the camps today, are relatives of those already settled. The schools have been running since September 1994.

Replacing the acute stress from war-effects are other problems, which seem to have more effect on the present well-being of families and children. These are related to long-term impact of a life in displacement, poverty, unemployment, lack of prospects for the future, loss of status, dependency on outside help, unpredictability and insecurity. Now children's rights and development are at risk due to hard labour, lack of nutritious food, domestic chores, decrease in school attendance, exposure to physical abuse, violence and mine injuries. This is not to say that children no longer suffer from the psycho-social effects of the war. A number of individual children will still suffer from prolonged distress and apart from the present hardships, many of the children are still struggling to overcome severe losses and separations (from parents, other relatives and friends).

In this situation children, who show symptoms or prove to have other special needs, will also require more individual attention and support from adults in order to be integrated into the schools or other activities on equal terms with other children. There are no project activities or procedures geared to meeting these needs.

2.3.4. The role of Parents

A core message in the STOP model is that the family must be kept together in times of war in the best interest of the child : " a healthy child in war is a child who is still protected by his family"(STOP Guidelines). Parents play a crucial role in the psycho-social support to children, which is an expected outcome of the STOP-seminars. The basic principle in this project is that parents, with encouragement and minimal material support from outside, will organise and run all the child-oriented activities on" self-help" basis.

The strength of this approach is that it builds on the culturally appropriate notion that the family is the most important social unit on which the Afghan child must rely for his/her protection and well-being. The strongly felt responsibility of the parents to act in the best interest of their children is appealed and responded to. The belief is that the most sustainable solutions to children's problems will always be found within the family structure and in order to reach out to all children, especially the girls, the family must be the base for all activities.

2.3.5. Failure to support parents

In placing the whole burden of responsibility on the parents, the fact that they themselves are suffering from the psycho-social effects of war and displacement has been overlooked. Thus the sustainability of this approach must be partly questioned.

The STOP-seminars are supportive of parents only in the sense that they alleviate their burden by explaining and advising on their children's behaviour. The activities run by parents certainly keep them busy and provide their children with good role models. There has been a failure to consider and plan for the support that parents and teachers need both to be parents and teachers in times of economic hardship and displacement.

To be fully supportive parents must be in a psychological and physical condition to respond to the needs of children. Children are in particular affected by the well-being of their mothers, who are the primary care-givers. Pregnant and lactating mothers and those with many small children are the ones most at risk to suffer from depression and being overwhelmed by their heavy burden. The Afghan women have a strong and supportive social network within the family system which provide them with security and mutual support. But their need for psycho-social support and assistance to link these needs with ongoing project activities has been largely neglected.

A psycho-social support programme for parents, especially directed to mothers, illiterate women and young girls, could, for example, have been considered. One option would have been to combine literacy classes with preventive health care education and general awareness on psycho-social needs and basic rights of women and girls. The need to increase educational opportunities for girls was noted in the Recommendations added to the Summary of the Mid-Term Evaluation produced in January 1995. Given the strong interest in female activities and the great potential for their development observed in this evaluation, an opportunity to both support parents more effectively and meet the demand from the community has been lost.

2.3.6. Failure to monitor well-being

What impact these non-formal activities have had on the well-being of war-affected children has not been monitored. This is partly because the failure to define and prioritise the needs of war-affected children has lead to no standards or indicators for running these activities being developed. It is also partly a result of the whole responsibility for running activities being delegated to parents. As parents are left alone running the activities they will also set the project standards according to what they can provide in the given circumstances.

2.4. Observations on Implementation

The changed conditions in the camps and the lack of support given to parents is reflected in the project activities and non-formal classes. Examples taken from the observations of ongoing classes and interviews with parents, teachers and children illustrate that many of these classes fail to meet the present psycho-social development needs of the children.

→ classes were taking place in an unhealthy environment. The shelters were falling down and were dusty. There were often no mats or materials to maintain any meaningful activity

→ In many classes children learnt nothing new nor were stimulated by the teacher.

→ Many children had problems in concentrating in class and the teachers had no means or skills in how to stimulate or assist students individually or in smaller groups when needed. In only exceptional classes did children get any breaks or opportunity to play. "If we give the children a break, they will run away", was a common remark by the voluntary teachers.

→ Teachers were unfamiliar with child-to-child techniques or involving the children actively in the learning process.

→ In the kindergarten,"kodakistan", classes, some of the children could not stay awake due to lack of energy and stimulation. The heat was also a contributory factor. Too many children (20-30 and aged 3-6, sometimes younger) were gathered in a dusty, congested tent or shelter with one adult trying to keep them busy without any materials, organised games or other play activities. The teacher was often a young and unexperienced female. Some of the parents interviewed questioned the usefulness of these classes under present conditions.

→ Some of the older children expressed a concern, that their interest in going to non-formal classes was decreasing due to lack of time and having to carry out domestic chores or earn money for the family budget.

→ Many were also discouraged by the lack of materials and infrequency of activities. Most volleyball classes were not active as either the ball was damaged or it was being kept by the teacher in his house.

→ Girls and young women, who were not enrolled in a formal school, showed a strong interest in literacy and were highly motivated to attend home-based classes. Many female volunteer teachers were struggling without any proper materials, or even basic teaching skills. Such poor quality classes might have adverse effects on the girls' motivation and learning capacity in the long run.

→ No child with a visible disability, physical or mental, was observed participating in non-formal classes. Children with these disabilities were mentioned in interviews and some were reported to be attending the formal school. This indicates that no concerted efforts have been made to include children with special needs in non-formal classes.

A survey with a detailed needs assessment of disabled children and other children with special

FINAL EVALUATION
OF
LOLA

"Play and Learning Activities Project"
Eastern Region Afghanistan

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Peshawar
May-July 1996

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APPENDICES:

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/ ACRONYMS

CAR	Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees
CBR	Community Based Rehabilitation
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
FW	Field Worker
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IIRO	International Islamic Relief Organisation
IRC	International Rescue Committee
LOLA	Lillehammer Olympic Aid
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NPO/RRAA	Norwegian Project Office/Rural Rehabilitation Association for Afghanistan
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
RBTU	Radda Barnen Training Unit
SAT	Social Animation Training
SCA	Swedish Committee for Afghanistan
SC/S	Swedish Save the Children
STOP	Structure, Talking, Organised play, Parental support
UN	United Nations
UNCHS	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNO	University of Nebraska in Omaha
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
WFP	World Food Programme